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Learning about and from other agents

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My background

MEng Bioengineering

Imperial College London, 2017-2021

RA in experimental neuro

University College London, 2021-2022

CDT in robotics and autonomous systems

University of Edinburgh, 2022-Supervised by Chris Lucas & Neil Bramley


What's so special about humans?


Language?

Tool use?

Abstract reasoning?

My preferred answer: social intelligence!







Two core problems

- 1 How do agents learn adaptive behaviour by observing others?
- How do agents construct representations of others by inferring latent properties (like beliefs and preferences)?


Why learn socially?




Trial and error





Trial and error



Social learning








Social learning is an effective way to deal with uncertainty more

safely: avoid dangers from exploration

efficiently: sidestep the cost of deliberation in large choice spaces

Social learning should be selective






Figure 1. Social learning strategies for which there is significant theoretical or empirical support. The tree structure is purely conceptual and not based on any empirical data on homology or similarity of cognition. The sources given are not necessarily the first descriptions or the strongest evidence, but are intended as literature entry points for readers.




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




Duffy, G.A., Pike, T.W., & Laland, K.N. (2009). Size-dependent directed social learning in nine-spined sticklebacks. Animal Behaviour, 78, 371-375.

These model-based social learning strategies generally deal with learning from more knowledgeable/proficient/successful agents

But what about when agents have different preferences?




Research question:

do people rationally select social learning targets on the basis of shared preferences?







Individual-level rational model

 $u^{(m)}$ = utility function of agent m

 $u^{\rm ego}$ = utility function of social learner (i.e. participant)

O = observations of agents' past choice behaviour


















Step 1: infer $p(u^{(m)}|O)$

Step 2: compute similarity weights $w^{(m)} = \mathbb{E} \left[\mathrm{sim}(u^{\mathrm{ego}}, u^{(m)})
ight]$

Step 3: imitate agent m with probability $\propto \exp(w^{(m)})$

Results: selective social learning from preference inference



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Limitations of the individual-level rational model



Assumes prior observational access to every agent's choice behaviour

(doesn't enable generalisation across agents)




Cognitive cost (separate inference process for every agent you encounter)

Follow-up study: *group-based* selective social learning under preference variation


4 items (2 feature dimensions)



Agents are organised into 2 groups



New variable: agent m expresses explicit visual cue $\phi^{(m)}$ as a noisy signal of their latent group identity $z^{(m)}$



New task: select imitation target on the basis of these explicit cues

Naïve ingroup bias model

"Copy the agent who looks most like me"

$$w^{(m)} = 1 - |\phi^{(m)} - \phi^{\text{ego}}|$$

imitate agent m with probability $\propto \exp(w^{(m)})$

Group-level rational model

Infer the relationship between group identity and preferences

 $z^{(m)}$ = latent group membership of agent m $u^{(m)}, \phi^{(m)}$ = utility function + explicit cue of agent m $u^{\mathrm{ego}}, \phi^{\mathrm{ego}}$ = utility function + explicit cue of social learner (i.e. participant) O = observations of other agents' past behaviour and explicit cues




Step 2: faced with new set of agents (not in *O*), estimate, for each

$$p(u^{(m)}|\phi^{(m)}) \propto \sum_z p(u^{(m)}|z)p(z|\phi^{(m)})$$


Step 3: compute similarity weights $w^{(m)} = \mathbb{E} \big[\mathrm{sim}(u^{\mathrm{ego}}, u^{(m)}) \big]$

Step 4: imitate agent m with probability $\propto \exp(w^{(m)})$



Two beween-participant factors:

1. whether groups correspond to dimension relevant to participant's utility function




2. participant's own explicit cue


If groups relevant: hidden / matched / mismatched

If groups not relevant: hidden / arbitrary

Groups irrelevant



Groups relevant



Agent's group

Takeaways

- 1. Given direct access to agents' choice behaviour, people can use theory-of-mind to select **preference-aligned** social learning targets
- 2. In the absence of direct choice evidence, people can use the relationships inferred between **group identity**, **explicit visual cues**, **and preferences** to generalise the same kind of strategy to **unfamiliar agents**
- 3. They do this even when their own 'group cue' is **actively mislabeled** -- overriding the ingroup bias when other evidence suggests it is not adaptive

Acknowledgements



Chris Lucas



Neil Bramley

