

Staying afloat on Neurath's boat

Guest lecture
INFR10054: Computational
Cognitive Science

November 4th 2024

Neil Bramley



Ed Psych (& Friends) Movember 2024

Supporting Volunteer Hub at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital

Before:



After...
(artist's
impression)




<https://www.justgiving.com/page/edpsych-movember-2024>

How do we learn how the world works?

We go from “blooming, buzzing confusion” (James, 1890)...



...to a world model that can support **prediction, diagnosis, imagination, planning**



Rational analysis approach to understanding how people come to understand the world

(Anderson, 1990; Marr 1978)



Probability & information theory

Experimental approach:

- Study tasks rich enough to reveal how people deal with complexity
- Build models that synthesise individual level behaviour

Frame problems
of human learning



Generate candidate
algorithms

Inspired by
machine learning


Adapt, refine,
rethink




Gather evidence

How do we learn how the world works?

- Can formalise probabilistic inference about world as the “ultimate” *inverse problem* (Bayes & Price, 1736; Earman, 1992; Pizlio, 2001)




What world gave rise to all this?




$$P(\underbrace{h}_{\text{some hypothesis}} | \underbrace{\mathbf{d}}_{\text{evidence}}) = \frac{\overbrace{P(\mathbf{d}|h)}^{\text{likelihood}} \overbrace{P(h)}^{\text{prior}}}{\underbrace{\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} P(\mathbf{d}|h') P(h')}_{\text{normalizing constant}}}$$

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What world gave rise to all this?





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How do we learn how the world works?

- Can formalise probabilistic inference about world as the “ultimate” *inverse problem* (Bayes & Price, 1736; Earman, 1992; Pizlio, 2001)

BUT:

- H : infinite/unknown
- $P(H)$ & historical \mathbf{d} : too large to store/compute over
- \mathbf{d} : causally ambiguous




$$P(\underbrace{h}_{\text{some hypothesis}} | \underbrace{\mathbf{d}}_{\text{evidence}}) = \frac{\overbrace{P(\mathbf{d}|h)}^{\text{likelihood}} \overbrace{P(h)}^{\text{prior}}}{\underbrace{\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} P(\mathbf{d}|h') P(h')}_{\text{normalizing constant}}}$$

How do we learn how the world works?


I will argue humans use combination of tricks to make learning possible:

- **Hypothesis space infinite/unknown** → Explore stochastically/incrementally.
 - **Data large/weak** → bootstrap accumulated knowledge
 - **Data causally ambiguous** → *Act on world* in ways that distinguish causes from effects (c.f. Gopnik, Meltzoff & Kuhl, 1999)
- + that if balanced appropriately, still results in boundedly rational belief formation






Various projects exploring bounded causal structure learning


1. Contingencies: Active causal learning in probabilistic causal systems (CBNs)



2. Compositional theories: Active inductive inference in open-ended contexts




Today: Contingencies



- Bramley, N. R.**, Dayan, P., Griffiths, T. L. & Lagnado, D. A. (2017). Formalizing Neurath's ship: Approximate algorithms for online causal learning. *Psychological Review*
- Bramley, N. R.**, Lagnado, D. A. & Speekenbrink, M. (2015). Conservative forgetful scholars: How people learn causal structure through interventions *JEP:LMC*
- Coenen, A., **Bramley, N. R.**, Ruggeri, A. & Gureckis, T. M. (2019). Testing one or multiple: Beliefs about sparsity affect causal experimentation. *JEP:LMC*
- McCormack, T., **Bramley, N. R.**, Frosch, C., Patrick, F. & Lagnado, D. A. (2016). Children's Use of Interventions to Learn Causal Structure. *JECP*.
- Meng, Y., **Bramley, N. R.** & Xu, F. (2018). Children's causal interventions combine discrimination and confirmation.
- Bramley, N. R.**, Dayan, P. & Lagnado, D. A. (2015). Staying afloat on Neurath's boat: Heuristics for sequential causal learning. *CogSci15*
- Bramley, N. R.** (2017). Constructing the world: Active causal learning in cognition. *PhD, UCL*


Causal Bayesian networks

Cheng 1997; Coenen, Rehder & Gureckis, 2015; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Gopnik et al 2004; Danks, 2014; Lagnado & Sloman, 2002; 2004; 2006; Pearl, 2000; Rehder, 2003; Steyvers et al, 2003; Waldmann & Holyoak 1992, Woodward, 2003



Idealised structure inference

Intervention #1





 =Active/
On
  =Inactive/Off

Expected value of interventions


+ = fixed on
 - = fixed off

Expected info




Probability distribution over structures


$w_B = w_S = \text{Beta}(1,1)$




Intervention #2






Expected value of interventions




Probability distribution over structures




Intervention #3



Expected value
of interventions



Probability
distribution over
structures




Hard because of the combinatorial explosion of possibilities...


Variables	Structures	Interventions	Outcomes
1	1	3	1
2	3	9	2
3	25	27	4
4	543	81	8
5	29281	243	16
6	3781503	729	32
7	1138779265	2187	64
8	783702329343	6561	128
9	~ 1213442000000000	19683	256
10	~ 4175099000000000000	59049	512

...and long-range dependencies

True causal structure:



Marginal dependencies:




- Can people deal with this complexity?
- And if so, how do they do it?

Task

370 adults in 3 Exps


Interact repeatedly with causal systems governed by unknown CBN with goal of learning structure:

- Perform interventions fixing variables
 - Observe resultant “activations” (green)
 - Guess the true network
 - Repeat... At end of trial, receive feedback
- Incentivized to be accurate
 - Range of (un)known w_B and w_S



Behavioural patterns

- Aggregate judgment patterns similar to posterior probabilities
- Individuals “**probability match**” (Shanks et al, 2001) — i.e., sample from, but don’t maximise over, posterior?




Behavioural patterns


- Aggregate judgment patterns similar to posterior probabilities
- Individuals probability match (Shanks et al, 2001) — i.e., sample from, but don't maximise over, posterior?
- **But** individuals' judgment sequences much too sequentially dependent
 - Too few edits between judgments (Bramley, Dayan & Lagnado, 2015b; Bramley, Dayan, Griffiths & Lagnado 2017)
 - Edits disproportionately reflect recent evidence (Bramley, Lagnado & Speekenbrink, 2015)

Types of "edit":

1. **Adding** a connection
2. **Removing** a connection
3. **Reversing** a connection



"Distance" between consecutive judgments




Goal

- **Process level** account of *group-level normativity* in face of *individual heterogeneity* and *sequential dependence* (cf. Courville & Daw 2007; Thaker, Tenenbaum & Gershman, 2017)
- Should show how people deal with *complexity* i.e., explain our *successes* in identifying pattern relating many variables

A model of local search

1. Search for local improvements to b^{t-1} by **adding, subtracting** or **reorienting** connections conditional on the others & “recent” data \mathcal{D}_r^t \mathcal{C}_r^t




2. After searching for k steps, stop and take b^t as new belief

3. If b^t differs from b^{t-1} $\mathcal{D}_r^t = \mathcal{C}_r^t = \{\}$

Starting belief of b^{t-1}

Asymptotic behaviour

$$P(M|\mathcal{D}_r^t; \mathcal{C}_r^t, \mathbf{w})$$




Aggregating over searches

$$P(M|\mathcal{D}_r^t; \mathcal{C}_r^t, \mathbf{w})$$

Connection to approximate Bayesian inference:

- Gibbs sampling to update
- Short search chain retains influence of starting point, i.e. a “single-particle particle-filter” (Vul et al, 2009; Sanborn et al, 2010; Courville & Daw, 2007)



A generalised model of incremental belief adaption

Probability that local search terminates at model m :

$$P(b^t = m | \underbrace{\mathcal{D}_r^t, \mathcal{C}_r^t}_{\text{Search based on "recent" evidence, \& interventions since last belief change}}, b^{t-1}, \omega, \lambda) = \sum_0^\infty \frac{\overbrace{\lambda^k e^{-\lambda}}^{\text{Search length parameter } \lambda \text{ controls average over search lengths}}}{k!} \left[\underbrace{(R_t^\omega)^k}_{\text{Matrix of Transitions}} \right]_{b^{t-1} m}$$

Behavior parameter: ω
interpolates between
0 = random
1 = Gibbs sampling
 ∞ = hill climbing


Predicts:

- Gradational sequential dependence between judgments due to limited search λ
- Noisily normative aggregate behavior (depending on ω)

Neurath's ship

“We [theorists] are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support.”

– W.V.O. Quine, (1960)




Judgment models

Compared Neurath's Ship (**NS**) against range of competitors:

1. Simple endorsement heuristic (**SE**) (Fernbach & Sloman, 2009; Waldmann, Cheng, Hagmayer & Blaisdell, 2008)
2. Win-stay, lose-sample (**WSLS**) (Bonawitz, Denison, Gopnik & Griffiths, 2014)
3. Random edits (**NS-RE**) (NS with ω fixed to 0)
4. Noisily **Rational** judgment (softmax over posterior)
5. Random judgments **Baseline**


- **NS** lowest overall BIC & best fit largest number of individual participants 155/370
- Search lengths $\lambda \approx 1.5$ & search behavior $\omega \approx 6$ (moderate hill climbing)



Discussion


- Neurath's **Ship** model — captures incremental causal belief change

- **Locally focused interventions?**



Yes see Bramley et al (2017); Gong & Bramley (2023), but a story for another day...

- **Temporal information?**



Yes. See Davis, Bramley & Rehder (2019, 2018a, 2018b); Bramley, Gerstenberg ↔ Mayrhofer & Lagnado (2018; 2017; 2014) also a story for another day...

Discussion

- While structure induction requires approximation...
- We still assumed a fixed, finite, hypothesis space
- But real settings are typically more open ended
- As is human thought, exhibiting **compositionally**, **systematicity**, “*infinite use of finite means*”


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


- Can we make sense of human learning in open-ended setting where hypothesis space is technically infinite?

Projects exploring bounded causal structure learning


1. Contingencies: Active learning in probabilistic causal systems (CBNs)



Compositional theories: Active inductive inference in open ended contexts



Taster, if time: Compositional theories



EPSRC New Investigator Grant (EP/T033967/1). Computational constructivism: The algorithmic basis of discovery

Zhao, B., Lucas, C. G., & Bramley, N. R. (2024). A model of conceptual bootstrapping in human cognition. *Nature Human Behaviour*.

Zhao, B., Lucas, C. G., & Bramley, N. R. (2022). How do people generalize causal relations over objects? A non-parametric Bayesian account. *Computational Brain & Behaviour*

Bramley, N. R., Zhao, B., Quillien, T., & Lucas, C. G. (2023). Local search and the evolution of world models. *Topics in Cognitive Science*.

Bramley, N. R., & Xu, F. (2023). Active inductive inference in children and adults: A constructivist perspective. *Cognition*.

Fränken, J. P., Lucas, C. G., Bramley, N. R., & Piantadosi, S. T. (2023). Modeling infant object perception as program induction. *CCN*

Fränken, J. P., Theodoropoulos, N. C., & Bramley, N. R. (2022). Algorithms of adaptation in inductive inference. *Cognitive Psychology*

Bramley, N. R., Rothe, A., Tenenbaum, J. B., Xu, F. & Gureckis, T. M. (2018). Grounding compositional hypothesis generation. *CogSci*.

A micro scientific induction task


Loosely based on Zendo™




Produces effect:




Does not produce effect:




A “scene”




A “cone”



If there is a small red cone?



If there is a small cone?



If a red cone is pointing left?


A red cone is the closest to the bottom left corner?

If there is a no blue cone and fewer than three green cones?

- Our guesses seem **symbolic & compositional**, seem to have language-like **productivity**
- Need mechanism for *generating, adapting, investigating* symbolic hypotheses...

Compositional theories


- **Constructivism** (Carey, 2009; Piaget 1970; Piantadosi, 2017)
influential idea in developmental psychology
 - In development/learning, we actively “construct” new ideas through **thinking**— **recombining & modifying ideas...**
 - ...and **play**—**exploring and discovering patterns**



- **How could this work algorithmically?**
Is this an apt account of human cognition/development?

Experiment


- 54 Children (8.9 ± 1.1) & 50 Adult mTurkers




5 tasks:

1. There is a red


Initial example




2. All same size




3. Nothing upright



4. Exactly 1 blue




5. Something blue
& small



Procedure:

Positive example

×1



Active learning

×7



Generalisation
predictions ×8



Free guess

×1

I think that...

Example of kids protocol



Original Articles

Active inductive inference in children and adults: A constructivist perspective




Neil R. Bramley^{a,1,*}, Fei Xu^b

^a Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom

^b Psychology Department, University of California, Berkeley, USA



- Counterintuitively: Children's hypotheses **more diverse & elaborate** than adults' —consistent with 'flatter', less tuned, generation mechanism (cf. Lucas, Griffiths, Bridgers & Gopnik, 2014) or perhaps also "hotter" search (Gopnik, 2020)
- Mimicking developmental trajectory from flexibility/diversity to predictability/performance key to synthesising humanlike learning





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
Algorithms of adaptation in inductive inference

Jan-Philipp Fränken^{a,*}, Nikos C. Theodoropoulos^{a,b}, Neil R. Bramley^a

^a Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom


^b Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, Suor Orsola Benincasa University of Naples, Italy

- Participants do Zendo task in two phases; we examine relationship between initial & revised guesses
- We find *syntax-level* anchoring on earlier guesses, (similar to structural anchoring in Neurath's ship paper)



Tree regrowth MCMC


- Established approach for program search/model estimation (Goodman et al, 2008; Piantadosi et al, 2016)



- Each new proposal deletes a random branch + regrows using *probabilistic context free grammar*
- Accepted according to function combining prior (complexity) and likelihood (fit)
- Many proposals constitute major edits, i.e. when regrown from near root

Tree “surgery” MCMC

- Novel MCMC proposal distribution (Fränken et al, 2022, *CogPsych*)



- Proposals limited to minimal “local” edits preserving downstream tree (unless they induce type-signature changes)
- Better model of participants’ revised generalisations and guesses
- Produces stronger sequential dependence + arguably more cognitively plausible model of symbolic search?

A model of conceptual bootstrapping in human cognition



Received: 24 January 2023

Bonan Zhao¹✉, Christopher G. Lucas² & Neil R. Bramley¹

Accepted: 8 September 2023

We explore power of type-constrained generation mechanism with a **“flexible library”** of primitives

Show it captures dramatic order effects (very different conclusions from same evidence depending on order presented)



Discussion

- *Computational constructivist* (or “*learning as program induction*”) framework \Rightarrow departure from fixed-dimension tasks & models
- Goal to explain *general* human **capacity** rather than explain *idiosyncratic* human **behaviours** (Bramley, Zhao, Quillien & Lucas, 2023, *Top/CS*)

Overall perspective

- **Hypothesis space infinite/unknown**
 - Solve manageable subproblems while conditioning on surrounding beliefs
 - Chain hypothetical edits to search further for more radical changes
 - Balance search to retain connection with posterior
→ **MCMC-style search**
- **Data large/weak** Build on accumulated knowledge via iterative compositional search
→ **Adaptor Grammar bootstrapping**
- **Data causally ambiguous** Localise evidence to support adaptation and refinement
- Interact & intervene to resolve focal uncertainty
→ **Do[X]**

Conclusions

- Humans succeed at learning complex representations by striking a balance between exploring in the **world**...
 - actively interacting with their surroundings
- ...and in the **mind**
 - actively adapting their theories and generating new hypotheses.

Thanks for listening!

<https://bramleylab.ppls.ed.ac.uk>



Thanks to collaborators on this stuff



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Princeton



<https://www.justgiving.com/page/edpsych-movember-2024>